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Unlike his Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya (ṢDS) Haribhadra Sūri's1 Śāstravārtāsamuccaya (ŚVS)2 
is not a compendium of philosophical systems (darśana) but a comprehensive account 
(samuccaya) of doctrinal (śāstra) expositions (vār[t]tā) or simply doctrines (vāda). The 
ŚVS is subdivided into stabakas, chapters or sections: (1) bhautika-vāda, on the 
materialism of Cārvāka or Lokāyata; (2) kāla-vāda, svabhāva-vāda, niyati-vāda and 
karma-vāda, on the doctrines about the leading principle in the world: time, essence, faith 
or karma; (3) īśvara-vāda, on the doctrine of God of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and prakṛti-
puruṣa-vāda, on the doctrine of the Soul and Primal Nature of the Sāṃkhya or, as I will 
translate it, the 'Creatrix'; (4) kṣaṇika-vāda, on the doctrine of momentariness of the 
Sautrāntika Buddhists; (5) vijñānādvaita-vāda, on the doctrine of consciousness-only 
(vijñāna-mātra) of the Yogācāra Buddhists; (6) śūnya-vāda, on the doctrine of emptiness 
of the Mādhyamika Buddhists; (7) nityānityatva-vāda, on the doctrine of eternity-and-
noneternity of the Jainas; (8) brahmādvaita-vāda, on the doctrine of the non-duality of 
Brahman of the Advaita Vedānta; (9) mokṣa-vāda, a discussion about the possibility or 
impossibility of Liberation; (10) sarvajñatā-pratiṣedha-vāda, on the doctrine of the 
negation of the possibility of omniscience of the Mīmāṃsā and an unidentified Buddhist 
sect (bauddha ekadeśī mata); and (11) śabdārtha-saṃbaṃdha-pratiṣedha-vāda, on the 
doctrine of the negation of the word-meaning relation of the Sautrāntika Buddhists. 
Below I will present a translation and analysis of section 3 of the ŚVS, viz. the section on 
īśvara-vāda and prakṛti-puruṣa-vāda: Haribhadra Sūri's Sanskrit ślokas together with 
                                                      
1 This Haribhadra, eight century, is the one called 'Yākinī-putra,' <spiritual> son of <the nun> Yākinī. This 
is clear from the colophon: ācārya-haribhadreṇa śāstra-vārtā-samuccayam in verse 699, and the use of the 
identity markers kṛtvā prakaraṇam, yad avāptaṃ, kuśalam, and viraha in verse 700 (Williams 1965: 103). 
 
2 Dixit 2002. Dixit's Hindi translation is not literatim. It is in fact a paraphrase. I will refer to it as P. To 
some verses Dixit adds a comment (Ṭippaṇī). I will refer to it as Ṭ. The translation of some of the Hindi 
parts was checked by Prof. Dr. Vooshmalla Krishna of the University of Hydarabad. 
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Dixit's Hindi paraphrase and commentary.3 For the analysis I will focus on those aspects 
of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya doctrines that are relevant for Haribhadra Sūri's 
presentation and criticism. As a Jaina Haribhadra Sūri is a non-theist and non-creationist.4 
As such he criticizes the īśvara concept of the Nyāya system.5 
                                                      
 
3 This article is the first of a series wherein each stabaka of the ŚVS will be translated and commented 
upon, that is, Haribhadra's ślokas together with Dixit's Hindi paraphrase and commentary. It is important to 
note that Haribhadra Sūri treats the philosophical doctrines separately. He does not link the sections 
mutually. This gave me the opportunity to study the sections in an order I could choose. I started with the 
the most basic and universal philosophical question: How did the universe (loka, jagat) arise? Was it 
created? and, Who or what did eventually create it? To illustrate the primal nature of these questions I refer 
to the famous hymn 10.129 of the Ṛgveda as rendered by Macdonell n.d.: 19: "(…) 6. Who knows for 
certain? Who shall here declare it? Whence was it born, and whence came this creation? The gods were 
born after this world's creation: Then who can know from whence it has arisen? 7. None knoweth whence 
creation has arisen; And whether he has or has not produced it: He who surveys it in the highest heaven, He 
only knows, or haply he may know not." Haribhadra deals with the question of creation in stabaka 3, 
combining the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya views in the same section. 
 
4 As it is formulated by Hemacandra in his Yogaśāstra 5.105-6: lokaḥ (…) niṣpādito na kenāpi na dhṛtaḥ 
kenacic ca saḥ; svayaṃ siddho nirādhāro gagane kiṃ tv avasthitaḥ (Gopani & Bothara 1989: 122): "This 
world is created by no one and supported by no one. It is self-established, without base and contained in 
space." 
 
5 The concept of īśvara as 'creator' or 'agent' (kartṛ) appeared in India somewhere around the beginning of 
our era. The question of the origin of the world is of course older. We note the famous nāsadīya-sūkta of 
the Ṛgveda 10.129 and the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 1.1 where as possible causes are considered: Time 
(kāla), Nature (svabhāva), Destiny (niyati), Fortuity (yādṛcchā), Primal Elements (bhūtāni) and Paramount 
Soul or (Puruṣa). The Mahābhārata mentions Karma, Fate (daiva) and Nature (svabhāva) as possible causes 
(Jacobi 1923: 38-39). The term īśvara for the supreme Puruṣa or Soul was first used in the Atharvaveda 
(Jackson 1986: 317). Maybe the first systematic refutation of the belief in a īśvara as the creator, ruler and 
destroyer of the world is found in the Twelve Gate Treatise of Nāgārjuna (c.150-c.250, Cheng 1976: 208). 
There is another small treatise ascribed to Nāgārjuna (though Jacobi (1923: 39) is skeptical about this), the 
Īśvara-kartṛtva-nirākṛtir Viṣṇor eka-kartṛtva-nirākaraṇam or 'Refutation of God as agent: Refutation of 
Viṣṇu as the Sole Agent' which exists in Sanskrit and Tibetan (Thomas 1903: 345-49). Īśvara is called a 
kartā here, but it is not clear of what he is an agent or a creator. The text simply states: yaḥ karoti sa karttā. 
yaḥ kriyāṃ karoti sa karttṛ-saṃjño bhavati or "Who acts is an actor. Who produces an action (der eine 
Handlung ausübt, Jacobi 1923: 39) is considered to be an actor." The idea that God is an agent or creator is 
specific for the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Vedānta systems. Later Sāṃkhya and also Yoga became theistic but 
in these systems īśvara is not considered as the efficient or material cause of the world. In Pātañjala Yoga 
God is simply a kind of individual Soul (puruṣa). His role is purely practical. By abstract contemplation of 
God (īśvara-praṇidhāna, Yogasūtra 1.23, YS 2.1, YS 2.32 and YS 2.45 as found in Prasāda 2000: 40, 88, 
159, and 168) who is untouched by afflictions, actions and fruition (YS 1.24, Prasāda 2000: 40), omniscient 
and unrestricted by time, the yogin reaches the state of samādhi or enstasy, the eighth and last stage of yoga 
practice. In Vaiśeṣika the 'arrival' of God as the creator of the world through 'unseen' powers (adṛṣṭa) is 
rather late, at the latest with Praśastapāda (5th or 6th c. AD). See Bronkhorst 1996a: 281 and Potter 1977: 
282ff. 
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ईरवादखडंन 
īśvara-vāda-khaṃḍana 
 
ईरः ूरेकने कता र् कैििदहेत।े 
अिचिचियुोऽनािदशु सिूरिभः॥१९४॥ 
194. īśvaraḥ prerakatvena kartā kaiścid iheṣyate; 
acintya-cic-chakti-yukto ’nādi-śuddhaś ca sūribhiḥ. 
 
Some scholars here accept that God is a creator because He has the nature to incite <all 
activity of living beings> and <they accept> that He has an inconceivable power of 
intelligence and is pure without beginning. 
 
P. Some scholars admit that God is an agent in the form of an inciter of all activity of 
living beings6 and that this God possesses inconceivable power of intelligence and that 
He is pure without beginning. 
 
Ṭ. The intention to say about God that He 'possesses an inconceivable power of 
intelligence' is the following. It is a supernatural divine frolic to know all things in the 
world even without the aid of a body, senses, etc.7 
 
The word preraka is found in the Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya 2:1:29 and 3:2:28, but not in the 
īśvara context.8 Guṇaratna Sūri uses preraka in the īśvara context in the maṅgala of his 
Tarkarahasyadīpikā (1412), that is, his commentary on Haribhadra Sūri’s ṢDS: "Theists 
think that everything is caused by the Lord of the world. God possesses the fourfold 
innate <capacities> of knowledge, desirelessness, virtue and masterfulness, and He is the 
inciter of heaven and hell for <all> living beings."9 In Nyāya the subject of īśvara is 
                                                      
 
6 P 56.5 ूािणय के समचू ेिबयाकलाप का ूरेक प स.े 
 
7 िचत ् = चतै. Ṭ 56.6 शरीर, इिय आिद की सहायता के िबना भी जगत ् की सब वओु ंको जान लेना एक अतु ईरीय लीला ह.ै 
 
8 NSBh 2.1.29 and 3.2.28 (Śhastri & Śukla 1942: 64 and 159). 
 
9  īśvara-vādinaś (…) sarvaṃ jagad-īśvara-kṛtaṃ manyante. īśvaraṃ ca saha-siddha-jñāna-vairāgya-
dharma-aiśvarya-rūpa-catuṣṭayaṃ prāṇināṃ ca svarga-apavargayoḥ prerakam iti (Jaina 2000: 17). 
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discussed under the head of the possible objects of knowledge (prameya). Early Nyāya 
does not consider God to be the creator of the world. Here God is only the agency 
(kāritatva) of human action (puruṣa-karma).10 The Nyāyabhāṣya of Vātsyāyana (or 
Pakṣilasvāmin, 425-500 A.D.) elaborates on this point but adds that God not only 'sets in 
motion' (pravartayati) the collections of dharma and adharma in each Soul but also the 
earth (pṛthivī), etc., The word kartṛ or kartā, however, is not used in this context.11 The 
Nyāyavārttika of Uddyotakara (first half of the 7th century) teaches that God 'supports' 
(anugṛhṇāti) human action which means that He unyokes the result of an action at the 
time of the working-out, and that He is the efficient cause of the world (nimitta-kāraṇa) 
of which earth, etc., is the material cause (upādāna).12 The Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā of 
                                                      
 
10 NS 4.1.19-21 (Jacobi 1923: 113ff.): athā’para āha: NS 4.1.19: īśvaraḥ kāraṇaṃ puruṣa-karmāphalya-
darśanāt. NS 4.1.20: na, puruṣa-karmābhāve phalāniṣpatteḥ. NS 4.1.21 tat-kāritatvād ahetuḥ: "Next, 
another <author> says: 'God is the cause because it is seen that human action <can be> without result.' 
<There is an objection: This is> not <true> since without human action no result is brought about. This is 
not an argument since <God has brought about> this <human action>." 
 
11 Nyāyabhāṣya (Jacobi 1923: 113ff.): puruṣo ’yaṃ samīhamāno nā’vaśyaṃ samīhā-phalaṃ prāpnoti 
tenā’numīyate: parādhīnāṃ puruṣasya karma-phalārādhanam iti; yad-adhīnam, sa īśvaraḥ; tasmād 
īśvaraḥ kāraṇam iti. īśvarādhīnā cet phala-niṣpattiḥ syād, api tarhi puruṣasya samīhām antareṇa phalam 
niṣpadyete’pi. puruṣa-kāram īśvaro ’nugṛhṇāti (…) viśiṣṭam ātmāntaram īśvaraḥ. tasya ca dharma-
samādhi-phalam aṇimādy-aṣṭa-vidham aiśvaryam (…) pratyātma-vṛttīn dharmādharma-saṃcayān pṛthivy-
ādīni ca pravartayati (…) āpta-kalpaś cā’yam: "The endeavoring man does not necessarily obtains the 
result of <his> endeavor. Therefore <we> conclude that the gratification of the result of <his> actions 
depends on someone else. From whom it depends is God. Therefore God is the cause. <Objection> If the 
occurrence of the result depends on God then the result would also be brought about without the endeavor 
of man. God supports human action. (…) God is a special other <kind of> Soul (…) As a result of <His> 
justice and enstasy He possesses lordship which is of eight kinds, the power of becoming as minute as an 
atom, etc., (…) He creates the collections of dharma and adharma occurring in each Soul and the earth, 
etc., (…) And He is someone who has done his duty (āpta-kalpa: 'einer, der gewissermaßen Alles erreicht 
hat,' Jacobi 1923: 76)." 
 
12 Nyāyavārttika (Jacobi 1923: 113ff.): īśvaro brahma īśanā-yogāt. cetanā-śaktiḥ kriyā-śaktiś ce’śanā. sā 
cā’sti brahmaṇī’ti brahme’śvaraḥ kāraṇaṃ jagataḥ. (…) paramāṇūpādānasya jagataḥ puruṣa-karmāpekṣa 
īśvaro nimitta-kāraṇam, yac ca tenā’pekṣaṇīyaṃ puruṣa-karma, tad apī’śvara-nimittakam eva. (…) 
prayojanaṃ vinā na prekṣāvatāṃ pravṛttiḥ; na ca prāpta-sakala-prāptavyasyā’sti prāpaṇīyaṃ kiṃcid 
īśvarasya. tasmāt kṛtam asya jagan-nirmāṇene’ty ata āha: āptakalpasye’ti: "If man would be 
independent<ly> capable of enjoying the fruits of <his> actions, then no one's action would be fruitless, nor 
would any one feel sorrow. But both are observed <to exist>. Therefore God is the cause (…) <Objection> 
If God, who depends on the actions <of man>, would be the cause of the production of the world, then God 
cannot be God vis-à-vis action. (…) We do not say that God is the cause irrespective of <human> action, 
etc., but that God supports human action. What does 'supporting' mean? He unyokes <the result of an 
action> for someone <only> at the time of the working-out (…) <NS 4.1.21> '(…) since <God> has 
brought about this <human action>.' Speaking thus it agrees that God is the efficient cause. If God is the 
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Vācaspatimiśra, however, does not explicitly mention God as the supporter of human 
action, but stresses the point that God is the efficient cause of the world.13 From this 
follows that Nyāya entertained two, arguably consecutive, ideas about the agency 
(kartṛtva) of God: (1) as an inciter of human activity and/or its results (karma), and (2) as 
the cause (kāraṇa) of the world and hence its creator. Haribhadra Sūri criticizes both 
conceptions of God independently and separately in two of his works, the 
Śāstravārtāsamuccaya and the Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya. First the ṢDS. Verse 13, on Nyāya 
philosophy, reads: "In the thought of Akṣapāda Śiva is the God who accomplishes the 
<periodic> creation and destruction, omnipresent, eternal, pre-eminent, omniscient, and 
seat of eternal Intellect."14 Here God is causing (kṛt) the creation and destruction of the 
world. God is not described as an agent (katṛ/kartā) of the working-out of karma nor the 
controller of dharma and adharma. This contrasts with the definition of God as a kartā 
given in the ŚVS verse 194 (see below). There is no mention here of God as the creator 
of the world. In the Laghuvṛtti of Maṇibhadra (date unknown) on the ṢDS the concept of 
God as an agent in the context of karma is treated, but only marginally so: "And the Lord 
(…) being omniscient (…) without anyone's wish bestows the enjoyment of happiness 
and sorrow for all living beings in heaven or hell by inference from the self-acquired 
merit or demerit. And accordingly it is said that 'This ignorant <mortal> creature having 
no power over his own joy or sorrow goes to heaven or to hell, driven by God'."15 
                                                                                                                                                                 
efficient cause of the world, what is said to be directly the material cause of the world? Earth, etc., the 
extremely subtle substance called atoms." 
 
13 nirapekṣaś cet puruṣaḥ karma-phala-bhoge samarthaḥ syāt, na kasyacid aphalā kriyā bhavet, na kaścid 
duḥkhaṃ kuryād iti. ubhayaṃ ca dṛṣṭam; tasmād īśvaraḥ kāraṇam iti. (…) evaṃ karma-sāpekṣaś ced 
īśvaro jagad-utpatti-kāraṇaṃ syāt, karmaṇī’śvaro ne’śvaraḥ syāt. (…) na brūmaḥ: karmādy-anapekṣa 
īśvaraḥ kāraṇam iti, api tu: puruṣa-karma īśvaro ’nugṛhṇāti. ko 'nugrahārthaḥ? yad yathā bhūtaṃ yasya 
yadā vipāka-kālaḥ, tat tathā tadā viniyunkta iti. (…) "tat-kāritatvād" evaṃ bruvatā "nimitta-kāraṇam 
īśvara" iti upagatam bhavati. (…) īśvaraś cej jagato nimittam, jagataḥ sākṣād upādāna-kāraṇaṃ kim 
uktam? pṛthivyādi parama-sūkṣmam paramāṇu-saṃjñitaṃ dravyam iti (Nyāyavārttika, Jacobi 1923: 76): 
"The Lord (or God, īśvara) is Brahman because He possesses 'lordship' (īśanā). The power to think and the 
power to act is 'lordship.' And because this is present in Brahman, Brahma-Īśvara is the cause of the world. 
(…) God, who is conditioned by human action, is the efficient cause of the world whereof atoms are the 
material cause. (…) <Objection> (…) without motive there is no activity of deliberate beings. For God, 
who has reached everything there is to be reached, there is nothing left to be reached. Therefore no need for 
Him to create the world. Accordingly <the author of the Bhāṣya> says: 'He is one who has done his duty.' 
(…)." 
 
14  ākṣapāda-mate devaḥ sṛṣṭi-saṃhāra-kṛc chivaḥ; vibhur nityaika-sarvajño nitya-buddhi-samāśrayaḥ 
(Damodara 1929: 11). 
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ज्ञानमूितघ ंय वरैाग्य ंच जगतःे। 
ऐय चवै धमर् सहिस ंचतुयम॥्१९५॥ 
195. jñānam apratighaṃ yasya vairāgyaṃ ca jagat-pateḥ; 
aiśvaryaṃ caiva dharmaś ca saha-siddhaṃ catuṣṭayam. 
 
He is the Lord of the universe whose four <capacities of> knowledge, desirelessness, 
masterfulness and virtue are unimpeded <and> naturally acquired. 
 
P. With reference to this God it is said that the knowledge of this Universal Lord, His 
renunciation, His glory and His justice are <all> four unimpeded16- meaning all-powerful 
- and naturally acquired.17 
 
Ṭ. This description of God is made in the terminology18 of the Sāṃkha system though the 
endorsement of theism is not found in Sāṃkhya works themselves. But the 
acknowledgement of the existence of God is found in the Yogasūtra and its Bhāṣya that 
<both> assume the ideas of the Sāṃkha on other doctrinal questions on existence.19 In the 
Yogasūtra and Bhāṣya the existence of God is accepted and He is considered to be a kind 
of Soul or Self.20 According to the Sāṃkhya system the knowledge (jñāna), renunciation 
(vairāgya), glory (aiśvarya) and justice (dharma) that are found in a common man are the 
result of the proper works21 of this man, and are more or less potent.22 According to the 
                                                                                                                                                                 
15 bhagavān (…) sarva-jñaś ca san (…) sakala-prāṇināṃ (…) svārjita-puṇya-pāpānumānena ca svarga-
narakayoḥ sukha-duḥkhopabhogaṃ dadānaḥ keṣāṃ nābhimataḥ, tathā coktam: īśvara-prerito gacchet 
svargaṃ vā śvabhram eva vā; anyo jantur anīśo ’yam ātmanaḥ sukha-duḥkhayoḥ (Damodara 1929: 13). 
This is verbatim verse 197 of the ŚVS (see below). 
 
16 P 56.14 अूितघ = अूितहत = सवर्-समथ र्. 
 
17 P 56.15 सहिस = सहजिसद्ध. 
 
18 Ṭ 56.16 शावली. 
 
19 Ṭ 56.18 सा-शाॐीय ू पर. 
 
20 Ṭ 56.19 पुषिवशषे = आािवशषे. 
 
21 Ṭ 56.22 कृित. 
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Yogasūtrabhāṣya the knowledge, renunciation, glory and justice found in God are 
naturally acquired and omnipotent. 23  The meanings of the words 'knowledge' and 
'renunciation' are clear. The meaning of the word 'glory' <consists of> the eight 
superhuman powers of minuteness, lightness, greatness, heaviness, etc.24 that in the Yoga 
books are described as the supernatural powers <of God>.25 The meaning of the word 
'justice' <consists of> some specific good qualities of character.26 Verse 195 is also found 
twice verbatim in Guṇaratna's Tarkarahasyadīpikā (c. 1412).27 Here the four qualities 
ascribed to God are reminiscent of the Yoga definition of an illuminated mind (rājasika 
citta). The Yogasūtrabhāṣya states: "The same <essence of mind> shining forth 
everywhere, the veil of delusion vanished, associated with rajas only obtains virtue, 
knowledge, desirelessness and masterfulness."28 The same qualities are also found in the 
Sāṃkhya system in the form of the four positive sāttvika bhāvas or 'fundamental strivings 
in the innermost core of human's nature': the predisposition toward meritorious behavior 
(dharma), towards knowledge (jñāna), towards non-attachment (vairāgya), and towards 
power (aiśvarya).29 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
22 Ṭ 56.22 नूािधक, more or less, सामर्स rich in power. 
 
23 Ṭ 56.24 सवर्साम र्सपं. 
 
24 Ṭ 57.1,2 िवभिूत (= िसि): अिणमा, लिघमा, मिहमा, गिरमा आिद. The standard list is: aṇiman, the power of becoming 
as minute as an atom; laghiman, extreme lightness; mahiman, illimitable bulk; prāpti, attaining or reaching 
anything (e.g. the moon with the tip of the finger); prākāmya, irresistible will; īśitā, supreme dominion; 
vaśitā, subjugating by magic; and kāmāvasāyitā, the suppressing all desires. Ṭ adds गिरमा, Skt. gariman, 
heaviness (making Himself heavy at will). 
 
25 Ṭ 57.2 अलौिकक क्षमताए.ँ 
 
26 Ṭ 57.3 चिरऽगत कितपय सणुिवशषे. 
 
27 Jaina 2000: 18 and 82. 
 
28 tad eva <citta-sattvam> prakṣīṇa-mohāvaraṇaṃ sarvataḥ pradyotamānam anuviddhaṃ rajo-mātrayā 
dharma-jñāna-vairāgyaiśvaryopagaṃ bhavati (Prasāda 2000: 5). 
 
29 See Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Sāṃkhyakārikā XXII & LXII, Larson (1998: 192) and Larson & Bhattacharya (1987: 
53). 
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अज्ञो जरुनीशोऽयमानः सखुःखयोः। 
ईरूिेरतो गेग वा ॅमवे वा॥१९६॥ 
 
196. ajño jantur anīśo ’yam ātmanaḥ sukha-duḥkhayoḥ; 
īśvara-prerito gacchet svargaṃ vā śvabhram eva vā. 
 
This ignorant <mortal> creature having no power over his own joy or sorrow goes to 
heaven or to hell, driven by God.30 
 
P. It is also said that the ignorant Soul is not the master of his own happiness and 
sorrow,31 but that he goes to heaven or to hell through the inducement of God.32 
 
This verse is almost verbatim verses 03,031.027a and 03,031.027c of the 
Āraṇyakaparvan of the Mahābhārata, 33  Māṭharācārya's commentary on the 
Sāṃkhyakārikā verse 61, 34  and Madhusūdana's commentary on verse 5.15 of the 
Bhagavadgītā. 35  The same verse is found verbatim in Vācaspatimiśra's 
Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā with reference to the Smṛti literature36 and also in Udayana's 
Nyāyakusumāñjali.37 
 
                                                      
 
30 Translated as "Blind and powerless with regard to his weal, man goes to heaven or hell as the Lord 
impels him" by Radhakrishnan 1929: 341, and "Unwissend ist die Kreatur, unfrei durch Leiden und 
Freuden; vom Herrn geführt kommt sie zum Himmel, der Herr treibt sie zur Hölle" by Schrader 1902: 61. 
 
31 P 57.6 यह अज्ञानी जीव अपन ेसखु-ःख का ामी य ंनह. 
 
32 P 57.7 ईर की ूरेणा स.े 
 
33 ajño jantur anīśo ’yam ātmanaḥ sukha-duḥkhayoḥ; īśvara-prerito gacchet svargaṃ narakam eva ca 
(Sukthankar 1942: 97). 
 
34 Id., Sarma 1922: 75. 
 
35 Id., Paṇśikar 1936: 127. 
 
36 Id., Dravid 1925: 604-605. 
 
37 See Nyāyakusumāñjali 5.22, ed. Viraraghavacharya 1941: 54. 
9 
 
अ ेिभदधऽ वीतराग भावतः। 
इ ंूयोजनाभावातृ र् ंयुत ेकथम॥्१९७॥ 
197. anye tv abhidadhaty atra vīta-rāgasya bhāvataḥ; 
itthaṃ prayojanābhāvāt kartṛtvaṃ yujyate katham. 
 
In this case however other <scholars> ask how it can possibly correct in that manner that 
He is an agent. For, He has no motive since He is without passion. 
 
P. Against this some other scholars38 object that when it is not established that God - who 
is Himself without passion - has a motive in the form mentioned, viz. the bestowal of 
inducement,39 how far is it rational to consider Him as the real creator of the activity of 
living beings? 
 
नारकािदफले कािंत ् कािंत ् गा र्िदसाधन।े 
कमर्िण ूरेयाश ुस जनू ् केन हतेनुा?॥१९८॥ 
198. nārakādi-phale kāṃścit kāṃścit svargādi-sādhane; 
karmaṇi prerayaty āśu sa jantūn kena hetunā? 
 
Some creatures He moves promptly into action resulting in hell, etc., some He moves 
promptly into action leading to heaven, etc. <But> for what reason? 
 
P. The question rises why God drives some living beings to such actions40 that result in 
the acquisition of heaven and some to such actions that result in the acquisition of hell. 
 
यमवे ूवत र् ेसाते ् िचऽकम र्िण। 
िनरथ र्किमहशे कतृ ंगीयत ेकथम?्॥१९९॥ 
 
                                                      
 
38 P 57.10 िक सर ेवािदय. 
 
39 P 57.11 ूरेणा-ूदान स.े 
 
40 कमर्िण ूरेयित = P 57.15 काम करन ेकी ूरेणा दतेा ह.ै 
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199. svayam eva pravartante sattvāś cet citra-karmaṇi; 
nirarthakam iheśasya katṛtvaṃ gīyate katham? 
 
And if <all> beings act on their own account alone in a variety of actions, why 
proclaiming that the Lord is the creator here. For, this makes no sense. 
 
P. If one argues that in <this> world living beings are engaged in different sorts of 
actions41 on their own accord42 the question rises why then this pointless pronouncement43 
that God is the creator of the activity of living beings? 
 
फलं ददाित चते ् सव तत ् तनेहे ूचोिदतम।् 
अफले पवू र्दोषः ात ् सफले भिमाऽता॥२००॥ 
200. phalaṃ dadāti cet sarvaṃ tat teneha pracoditam; 
aphale pūrva-doṣaḥ syāt saphale bhakti-mātratā. 
 
If He gives all results <of all actions> here, directed by Him, then, if <these actions> are 
ineffective <in producing their result on their own account> the previous flaw remains. If 
<they are> perchance effective <in producing their result on their own account, God is a 
matter of> faith only. 
 
P. One can say that all actions of living beings are established as giving their respective 
results by the inducement of God. But our answer to this is, that if actions are 
ineffective44 in producing their result on their own account,45 our previous objection 
remains in position, viz. why does God induce <living beings> in the direction of actions 
that lead some living beings to heaven and some living beings in the direction of actions 
                                                      
 
41 P 57.20 अनकेानके ूकार की िबयाओ ंम. 
 
42 P 57.21 ेा स,े by their own will. 
 
43 P 57.21 बकेार ही यह ्गीत. 
 
44 अफल = P 58.1 असमथ र्. 
 
45 P 58.1 तः फल दने ेम. 
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that lead to hell. And if they are effective in producing the effect on their own account, 
the postulation46 of God is a matter of faith alone. For, then it is established that He has 
no motive. 
 
आिदसगऽिप नो हतेःु कृतकृ िवत।े 
ूितज्ञातिवरोिधात ् भावोऽूमाणकः॥२०१॥ 
201. ādi-sarge ’pi no hetuḥ kṛta-kṛtyasya vidyate; 
pratijñāta-virodhitvāt svabhāvo ’py apramāṇakaḥ. 
 
Someone who has already done all that has to be done, has no reason for a primal 
creation also. For, that would be contradictory with the <basic> postulate <that He has 
already accomplished everything>.47 Also <to argue that all this> is God's essence is 
unwarranted. 
 
P. Next, if the theist48 postulates that God is a kṛta-kṛtya, a Soul that has accomplished all 
that has to be accomplished or, in other words, a Soul with no activity left,49 there is no 
reason possible for Him to start a creation. For, if the theist accepts such a cause a 
conflict will arise with his basic postulate,50 viz. with his postulate that God is a Soul that 
is kṛta-kṛtya. Moreover, to say that all this is decisively the essence of God is an 
unwarranted matter, that is, the existence of God is not validly established.51 
 
                                                      
 
46 P 58.5 कना. 
 
47 kṛta-kṛtya: "Parvient à ses fins krtakrtya signifie littér. qui a fait ce qu'il devait faire, c'est-à-dire qui voit 
tous ses désirs accomplis" (Strehly 1893: 93 note). 
 
48 P 58.10 ईरवादी. 
 
49 P 58.8 एक ऐसी आा िजस ेकोई काम करना शषे नह. 
 
50 P 58.10 मलू-मतं. 
 
51 P 58.13 वतुः ईर का अि ही ूमाण िस नह. 
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Kṛta-kṛtya is a term commonly used in ritual context but it is also used in other 
contexts,52 as i.e. in Yoga literature.53 In the first context, it refers to someone who has 
done his rituals as prescribed. In the second it refers to a yogin who has attained samādhi 
and has become perfect. In common parlance it is also used to speak of a person who 
follows God's precepts.54 So a kṛta-kṛtya is someone who has performed all his duties, 
who is completely realized and satisfied, and hence who has nothing to strive for 
anymore, as i.e. the creation of the world. 
 
कमा र्देभाव ेन िकिद ्बात ेिवभोः। 
िवभो ुतभाव ेकृतकृबाधनम॥्२०२॥ 
202. karmādes tat-svabhāvatve na kiñcid bādhyate vibhoḥ; 
vibhos tu tat-svabhāvatve kṛta-kṛtyatva-bādhanam. 
 
If action, etc., would have that essence <to produce its result without God's intervention> 
the Lord<'s existence> is nothing to be set aside. If, however, the Lord would have that 
essence <to instigate action and provide the result> this is annulled by <His> being 
someone who has accomplished everything he wants. 
 
P. When one accepts that action, etc., has the essence mentioned, that is, if one accepts 
that it is effective in the production of its result without depending on God,55 no difficulty 
of any sort arises in relation to the existence of God. However, in that case God is not the 
inducer of the actions of living beings. But if one accepts that God has the essence 
mentioned, that is, if He is the inducer of actions and the provider, etc., of the result of 
                                                      
 
52 "(…) kṛtakṛtyo ’ham tvayi prasanne. The translation 'puisque tu es bien disposé [a mon egard], c'est que 
j'ai fait ce que je devais faire' is unnecessarily cumbersome. Rather: 'if you are satisfied, so am I.' (…) 
Kṛtakṛtya is such a common term that I would hesitate to go as far as seeing in it the 'predominance du 
contexte rituel, idée d'un rituel devant etre accompli'" (Rocher 2000, n. 59). 
 
53 "When the yogin has attained this samādhi, he has become perfect (kṛtakṛtya) and lives forever in the 
bliss of Brahman: he can then also be called a jīvanmukta" (Klostermaier 1986: 254). 
 
54 Personal communication Prof. Vooshmala Krishna, University of Hyderabad, 2009. 
 
55 P 58.16 ईर पर िनभ र्र रह ेिबना. 
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these actions,56 then a difficulty arises in relation to this recognition, viz. that God is a 
Soul that is kṛta-kṛtya and that He has achieved all there is to be achieved. 
 
ततेरकतृ र्वादोऽय ंयुत ेपारम।् 
सग ् ायािवरोधने यथाऽऽः शुबुयः॥२०३॥ 
203. tataś ceśvara-kartṛtva-vādo ’yaṃ yujyate pāram; 
samyag nyāyāvirodhena yathā’’huḥ śuddha-buddhayaḥ. 
 
And accordingly wise men declare for instance that this doctrine of a God-creator is 
thoroughly justified and correct since it is logically not contradictory. 
 
P. All this being said, we can say that the God-creator doctrine is, in a specific sense, 
appropriate and logical,57 as it is for example58 formulated by some pure minds. 
 
ईरः परमावै तोतसवेनात।् 
यतो मिुताः कता र् ाद ्गणुभावतः॥२०४॥ 
204. īśvaraḥ paramātmaiva tad-ukta-vrata-sevanāt; 
yato muktis tatas tasyāḥ kartā syād guṇa-bhāvataḥ. 
 
A Supreme Soul <can also be called a> god because <one can reach> Liberation by 
resorting to the manner of life proclaimed by him. Therefore, in a secondary meaning, he 
can be an agent of this <Liberation>. 
 
P. God is also another name of a Supreme Soul, that is, an omniscient person standing at 
the threshold of Liberation.59 Since a living being can attain Liberation by following the 
                                                      
 
56 P 58.20 काम का फल-दाता आिद. 
 
57 P 58.25 समिुचत तथा तकर्सगंत. 
 
58 P 58.25 यथा = उदाहरण के िलए. 
 
59 P 59.3 मिु के ार पर खड ेसवर्ज्ञ मन ुं य. 
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way of life suggested by such a Supreme Soul,60 therefore he can, in a subsidiary 
meaning,61 also be called an agent of this Liberation. 
  
The equation of a fully liberated and hence Supreme Soul (not necessarily on the 
'threshold' of Liberation) with God is also found in later monistic Vedānta in the context 
of kṛta-kṛtya.62 In Jaina context an Arhat like Mahāvīra is "a Lord of yogins (jogiṇāhaṃ)" 
and a kṛta-kṛtya, "one who has discharged one's obligation (who has done what was to be 
done)."63 
 
तदनासवेनादवे यत ् ससंारोऽिप ततः। 
तने तािप कृ र् ंकमान ंन ित॥२०५॥ 
205. tad-anāsevanād eva yat saṃsāro ’pi tattvataḥ; 
tena tasyāpi karttṛtvaṃ kalpyamānaṃ na duṣyati. 
 
By not resorting to this <manner of life proclaimed by a Supreme Soul> the result is in 
fact transmigration. For that reason it is not wrong to consider him also to be an agent <of 
the worldly cycle>. 
 
P. Otherwise, for a living being not following the path suggested by a Supreme Soul 
mentioned64 results in fact in the being caught in the worldly cycle or the cycle of rebirth. 
In such case it is not wrong also to assume that this Supreme Soul is an agent of this 
worldly cycle.65 
                                                      
 
60 तोतसवेनात ् = P 59.4 परमाा ारा सझुाए गए आचरण-माग र् पर चलन ेस.े 
 
61 गणुभावतः = P 59.6 गौण अथ र् म. 
 
62 "Once the Soul as pure, stainless and uncreated Intelligence is thus revealed (…) the I becomes serene 
and free and abides happily in the Soul which is supreme bliss itself (XV, 19,20). In this state the Soul 
becomes the Absolute to witch such names as the essence of wisdom, God (italic mine) and transcendence 
are equally applicable (kṛtakṛtya, X, 18)" (Mukerjee 1997: 115). 
 
63 Singh 2001: 1167, 1169. 
 
64 P 59.13 उ परमाा ारा सझुाए गए माग र् पर न चलन ेका ही फल. 
 
65 ससंार = P 59.11 ससंार-चब = पनुज र्चब. 
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A Supreme Soul is an example to follow. If one follows it, one reaches Liberation, if not, 
one remains caught in the cycle of rebirth. In both cases this Supreme Soul is a cause or 
an 'agent' of Liberation or bondage. 
 
कता र्ऽयिमित ताो यतः केषािंचदादरः। 
अतदानगुणु्यने त कतृदशेना॥२०६॥ 
206. kartā’yam iti tad-vākyo yataḥ keṣāṃcid ādaraḥ; 
atas tad-ānuguṇyena tasya katṛtva-deśanā. 
 
The statement that he is an agent follows from the respect some have <for the teachings 
of a Supreme Soul as mentioned>. Accordingly, for that reason, it is shown that he is an 
agent <of the bondage and Liberation of living beings>. 
  
P. In some people's mind reverence for the teachings of the Supreme Soul as mentioned 
<earlier> eventually66 engenders the understanding that this Supreme Soul is an agent of 
the bondage and Liberation of living beings.67 This is the reason that authors of the 
Śāstras, keeping in mind the mental state of these people, have called a Supreme Soul an 
agent of bondage and Liberation of living beings. 
 
परमैय र्युात आवै चेरः। 
स च कतित िनदषः कतृ र्वदो वितः॥२०७॥ 
207. paramaiśvarya-yuktatvān mata ātmaiva ceśvaraḥ; 
sa ca karteti nirdoṣaḥ kartṛ-vado vyavasthitaḥ. 
 
If a Soul possesses supreme sovereignty it is considered to be a god and, to say that this 
<soul> is an agent is established as a faultless theory. 
 
P. On the other hand, if he is perfect by reason of his supreme sovereignty a Soul can be 
considered to be a god because the agent of various actions to be done by a living being is 
                                                      
 
66 P 59.17 फलप ही. 
 
67 P 59.17 ूािणय के ब-मोक्ष का कता र्. 
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the Soul of this living being.68 Therefore the doctrine of a God-Agent is established as a 
faultless theory. 
 
T. According to the Jaina doctrine a Soul is omnipotent69 by nature. But its capacity 
remains disproportionally disconcert 70 as a consequence of the accumulation of karma. 
With this idea in mind Haribhadra says that a Soul "possesses supreme sovereignty." 
 
शाकारा महाानः ूायो वीतहृा भव।े 
साथ र्संू वृा कथ ंतऽेयुभािषणः॥२०८॥ 
208. śāstra-kārā mahātmānaḥ prāyo vīta-spṛhā bhave; 
sattvārtha-saṃpravṛttāś ca kathaṃ te ’yukta-bhāṣiṇaḥ. 
 
The authors of the Śāstras, exceedingly wise, were mostly free from desire in this worldly 
existence. Devoted <as they are> to the welfare of beings, why would they say 
unreasonable things? 
 
P. Actually, the great men that composed the Śāstras were mostly liberated from worldly 
ambitions and they did everything purely out of philanthropy.71 Why then would they say 
such a thing if this was not reasonably established?72 
 
T. The reasoning of Haribhadra is as follows. Since the great men that composed the 
Śāstras were telling the truth73 and since the doctrine of a God-Creator is in a strict 
                                                      
 
68 P 59.23 एक ूाणी ारा की जान ेवाली उन उन िबयाओ ंका कता र्. 
 
69 T 59.26 सवर्सामर्सपं. 
 
70 T 59.27 नूािधक कुिण्ठत. 
 
71 साथ र् = P 60.6 परोपकार. 
 
72 P 60.7 जो यिुसगंत न हो. 
 
73 T 60.9 सवा. 
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specific sense74 reasonably established, wherever in the Śāstras the doctrine of a God-
Creator is advocated, it must suit this specific sense only.75 
 
अिभूायतषेा ंसग ् मगृ्यो िहतिैषणा। 
ायशाािवरोधने यथाऽऽह मनरुदः॥२०९॥ 
209. abhiprāyas tatas teṣāṃ samyag mṛgyo hitaiṣiṇā; 
nyāya-śāstrāvirodhena yathā’’ha manur apy adaḥ. 
 
Someone who desires <his> welfare should investigate the intention of these <authors of 
the Śāstras> thoroughly so that no contradiction arises with the science of logic. A wise 
man expresses himself accordingly. 
 
P. For a person desiring his own benefit76 it is necessary that he investigates the intention 
of the authors of the Śāstras thoroughly77 in such manner that no contradiction between 
the logic of the intention expressed and the statements in the Śāstras arises. 
 
T. In relation to the statements of the Śāstras one must emphasize that there should be no 
contradiction between their intention and the statements in the Śāstras. The implication is 
precisely this, that some ambiguous78 Śāstra statements should not be given such a 
meaning that their contradiction would befall some <other> unambiguous Śāstra 
statements. 
 
आष च धमर्शा ंच वदेशाािवरोिधना। 
यक णानसुधं ेस धम वदे नतेरः॥२१०॥ 
                                                      
 
74 T 60.9 एक अथ र्िवशषे म ही. 
 
75 T 60.11 उस ेयही अथ र्िवशषे पहनाना चािहए. 
 
76 िहतिैषणा = P 60.14 अपना िहत चाहन ेवाले ि को. 
 
77 सक ्= P 60.15 भली ूकार स.े 
 
78 T 60.20 सिंदग्धाथ र्क. 
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210. ārṣaṃ ca dharma-śāstraṃ ca79 veda-śāstrāvirodhinā; 
yas tarkeṇānusaṃdhatte sa dharmaṃ veda netaraḥ. 
 
One who explores the Veda and the Dharmaśāstra with a logic that is not contradictory 
with the Veda and Śāstras knows the dharma, no other. 
 
P. A person who investigates the books given by the Seers, the Vedas, etc., the 
Dharmaśāstra books and the Purāṇas, etc., with the help of a logic that does not go 
against the teachings of the Vedas and the Dharmaśāstras, knows the dharma, no one 
else. 
 
ूकृितपुषवादखण्डन 
prakṛti-puruṣa-vāda-khaṇḍana 
Refutation of the Doctrine of the Creatrix and the Soul80 
 
ूधानोवम ेत ुम ेसवर्मवे िह। 
महदािदबमणेहे काय र्जात ंिवपितः॥२११॥ 
211.  pradhānodbhavam anye tu manyante sarvam eva hi. 
mahad-ādi-krameṇeha kārya-jātaṃ vipaścitaḥ. 
 
Other wise men, however, think that all originates from the First Principle <and> that 
here <out of this First Principle> by degrees the Intellect, etc., is produced as an effect 
<of that>. 
 
P. Other learned men say that all worldly activity originates from a principle that is called 
the 'First Principle' from where a chain of production <of evolutes> moves on, the 
Intellect, etc., amidst.81 
                                                      
 
79 Ṭ informs that in lieu of 'आष च धमर्शा ंच' the Sūcanānusāra of Yaśovijaya reads 'आष धमपदशे ंच.' 
 
80 All translations of the Sāṃkhya puruṣa (lit. the 'Man'), Soul, Soul or Spirit, are ultimately unsatisfactory. 
 
81 P 61.8 बीच म डालता आ. It is unclear why Dixit restricts the list of the Sāṃkhya principles (tattva) to twenty 
evolutes. In P. on 212 he enumerates the classical twenty-four evolutes, locking out the Puruṣa. 
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ूधानाद ्महतो भावोऽहंकार ततोऽिप च। 
अक्षताऽवग र् ताऽाद ्भतूसहंतःे॥२१२॥ 
212. pradhānād mahato bhāvo ’haṃkārasya tato ’pi ca; 
akṣa-tan-mātra-vargasya tan-mātrād bhūta-saṃhateḥ. 
 
From the First Principle the Intellect arises and from that Egoity, the class of the senses,82 
the rudimentary elements, and the collection of <gross> elements. 
 
P. These are the successive stages: From the First Principle the Intellect arises, from the 
Intellect Egoity, from Egoity the eleven senses and the five rudimentary or subtle 
elements,83 from the rudimentary elements the great or gross elements.84 
 
The Puruṣa, the Universal Soul, which is uncreated and non-creative, is the first of the 
twenty-five principles (tattva) of classical Sāṃkhya. The other twenty-four principles are: 
the Creatrix (prakṛti, pradhāna) in its manifest (vyakta) form: the principles of the 
Intellect (buddhi) also called the 'Great One' (mahat), Egoity (ahaṃkāra), the internal 
organ of sense (manas), the five subtle elements (tan-mātra),85 the five organs of sense 
(buddhīndriya),86 the five organs of action (karmendriya),87 and the five gross elements 
(mahā-bhūta).88 With the 'class of the senses' (akṣa) or the 'eleven senses' (indriya) are 
meant: manas, the five buddhīndryas and the five karmendriyas.89 
                                                      
 
82 P 61.12 अक्ष = इिय. 
 
83 P 61.13 ताऽ = सु भतू. 
 
84 P 61.13 महाभतू = लू भतू. 
 
85 Sound (śabda), touch or contact (sparśa), form (rūpa), taste (rasa), and smell (gandha) (Larson & 
Bhattacharya 1987: 49). 
 
86 That is, the senses of seeing (cakṣus), hearing (śrotra), smelling (ghrāṇa), touching (tvac), and tasting 
(jihvā) (Larson & Bhattacharya 1987: 49). See SK 26/1: buddhīndriyāṇi cakṣuḥ-śrotra-ghrāṇa-rasana-
tvag-ākhyāni (Sharma 2009: 32). 
 
87 Hand (pāṇi), foot (pāda), larynx (vāc), organ of generation (upastha), and excretion (pāyu) (Larson & 
Bhattacharya 1987: 49). See SK 26/2: vāk-pāṇi-pāda-pāyūpasthān karmendriyāny āhuḥ (Sharma 2009: 
32). 
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घटािप पिृथािदपिरणामसमुवम।् 
नाापारज ंिकित ् तषेा ंलोकेऽिप िवत॥े२१३॥ 
213. ghaṭādy api pṛthivy-ādi-pariṇāma-samudbhavam; 
nātma-vyāpāra-jaṃ kiñcit teṣāṃ loke ’pi vidyate. 
 
A jar, etc., is produced from the transformation of earth, etc. According to these 
<Sāṃkhya scholars> nothing in this world exists that is caused by an operation of the 
Soul. 
 
P. The question is up to what extent a jar, etc., is produced. According to the <Sāṃkhya> 
scholars mentioned its cause is the transformation90 of earth, etc., only. This is because 
according to these scholars no action of the Soul <can be> the cause of the production of 
any object in the world. 
 
According to Sāṃkhya the phenomenal world is ruled by processes of continuous change 
or transformation (pariṇāma) of the guṇa ratios. Every product is a transformation of one 
state into another as in case of a jar produced from a lump of clay.91 The Sāṃkhya puruṣa 
is intrinsically inactive. It is a non-agent (akartṛ) and cannot be involved in any process 
of causation or production in contrast to the jīva, the Soul of the Jainas which is fully an 
agent (kartṛ). 
 
अ ेत ुॄवुत ेतेत ् ूिबयामाऽवण र्नम।् 
अिवचायव तद ्युा ौया गत ेपरम॥्२१४॥ 
214. anye tu bruvate hy etat prakriyā-mātra-varṇanam; 
avicāryaiva tad yuktyā śraddhayā gamyate param. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
88 Space or ether (ākāśa), wind or air (vāyu), fire (tejas), water (ap), and earth (pṛthivī) (Larson & 
Bhattacharya 1987: 49, see also Larson 1998: 8ff.). 
 
89 " (…) the Sankhya recognizes eleven senses, five of which are called Cognitive senses, five, Active 
senses, and the remaining one, Manah or the internal sense" (Majumdar 1925: 65). 
 
90 पिरणम = P 61.17 पार-ूाि. 
 
91 Larson (1975: 31; 1998: 166). 
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Others, however, declare that this description of pure production is made without 
reasonable reflection92 <and that> it is no more than a matter of faith. 
 
P. But some other scholars say that all descriptions given above are only imagination 
coined by the mind93 so that if persons allege these descriptions they are doing so 
succumbing to faith94 in such a manner that they do not reason rationally. 
 
Arguably the word prakriyā is used here in the sense of pariṇāma (transformation).95 
Sāṃkhya is generally identified with a theory of 'transformation' (pariṇāma-vāda) that is 
associated with a theory of causality called sat-kārya-vāda.96 The development of all 
other tattvas from the Creatrix is ruled by one mechanism only, the "tripartite process"97 
of the three guṇas or evolutes that constitute all psycho-material substance: sattva, rajas 
and tamas. These terms cover a variety of meanings but can be roughly translated as 
purity or goodness, energy or passion, and dullness or ignorance. This Sāṃkhyan 
tripartite process that can be called traiguṇya-pariṇāma 98  is in fact primordial 
                                                      
 
92 अिवचाय र् + युा. 
 
93 P 61.22 एक मनगढ़ कना माऽा. 
 
94 P 61.24 ौा के वशीभतू होकर. 
 
95 "The word prakriyā has a well-established sense of derivation, bringing constituents together in such a 
way that a final product emerges" (Aklujkar 2001: 462, italics mine). 
 
96 "The earliest critique of the notion of cause is to be found in the satkāryavāda doctrine of the Sāṃkhya 
school, which was historically the earliest of Indian philosophic systems. The doctrine means that the so-
called effect preexists in its cause, causation being merely a change or transformation from one state to 
another while the original 'thing' (…) remains constant and unchanging. An effect means a change in only 
the attributes or characteristics of the thing, a new state of affairs means manifestation of what was 
potentially present (…) in the early state of affairs, that is, in its so-called cause" (Matilal 1975: 43). 
Bronkhorst 1996b: 2 explains sat-kārya-vāda concisely as: "(…) the fact that we say 'the jar comes into 
being’ implies that the jar must be part of the situation described by that statement, and must consequently 
be there prior to its coming into being.' 
 
97 Larson & Bhattacharya 1987: 66. 
 
98 "In a Sāṃkhyan context, the traiguṇya issue is resolved by considering it an emanation or transformation 
(pariṇāma) from primordial materiality (mūla-prakṛti), radically separated and different from the principle 
of pure transcendental consciousness (puruṣa)" (Rigopoulos 1998: 165). 
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materiality.99 So all psycho-material substances are Prakṛti in transformation. There is 
nothing but production (prakriyā-mātra). 
 
युा त ुबात ेयात ् ूधान ंिनिमत।े 
तथााूतुौ चा महदािद कथ ंभवते?्॥२१५॥ 
215. yuktyā tu bādhyate yasmāt pradhānaṃ nityam iṣyate; 
tathātvāpracyutau cāsya mahad-ādi kathaṃ bhavet? 
 
However this goes against reason since the First Principle is acknowledged to be eternal. 
Now, until it does not deviate from this state <of eternal stability>, how then can the 
Intellect arise <from it>. 
 
P. This description is contrary to reason because the First Principle here is considered to 
be eternal. But until the First Principle does not give up its primal state,100 how shall it 
give birth to the Intellect, etc. 
 
तवै तभावािदित चते ् िकं न सवर्दा। 
अत एविेत चते ् त तथा ेनन ुतत ् कुतः?॥२१६॥ 
216. tasyaiva tat-svabhāvatvād iti cet kiṃ na sarvadā; 
ata eveti cet tasya tathātve nanu tat kutaḥ? 
 
If one argues that this is the essence of that <First Principle to produce the Intellect, etc.>, 
why not always? If one argues: Because of that!, then how is this ever possible when this 
<First Principle remains> in such a <stable> condition? 
 
                                                      
 
99 "(…) although three guṇas are mentioned, namely, sattva, rajas, and tamas, the basic Sāṃkhya 
conceptualization is that of one, continuous and unique process with three discernible "moments" or 
"constituents." There is one continuous process of transformation (pariṇāma), which is the inherent 
generativity of primordial materiality, but this one continuous process manifests itself in three inextricably 
related constituents that intensionally define the unique, continuous process" (Larson & Bhattacharya 1987: 
66). 
 
100 P 62.1 मलू-प. 
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P. One can say that the production of the Intellect is the very essence of the Creatrix. But 
then our question is: Why does the Creatrix not produce the Intellect every moment? The 
answer can be that it is also the essence of the Creatrix to produce the Intellect, etc., now 
and then <only>. But then our question is: How can the accidental production of the 
Intellect from the Creatrix be possible when this Creatrix abides in an unmoved existence 
in its primal state?101 
 
According to the Sāṃkhya the Creatrix starts to produce its evolutes at a certain point in 
time after a pralaya or a period of universal dissolution. Then the unmanifest Creatrix 
starts to move as a result of the upsetting of the previous equilibrium of the guṇas102 and 
becomes a manifest Creatrix. Gradually it produces the Intellect up to the gross elements. 
The question is: If the unmanifest Creatrix has an unmoved and stable essence, why does 
it come into action at a certain moment, and why not always? Conversely, if it would 
have the inherent capacity to produce the evolutes, why not continuously <so>. 
 
नानपुादानम भावऽेातिुचद ्भवते।् 
तपादानताया ंच न तकैािनता॥२१७॥ 
217. nānupādānam anyasya bhāve ’nyaj jātucid bhavet; 
tad-upādānatāyāṃ ca na tasyaikānta-nityatā. 
 
The production of one thing from another without a material cause is not possible at all 
and, if this <first thing - the Creatrix> is the material cause of that <second thing - the 
Intellect, the first thing> is not absolutely eternal. 
 
P. Even when one object - the Creatrix for instance - is present,103 a second object - the 
Intellect for instance - cannot be produced as long as the material cause of this second 
object is not present also. If the first object mentioned would be the material cause of the 
                                                      
 
101 P 62.11 जब तक वह (अथा र्त ् ूधान) अपन ेमलूप म अिवकृत भाव स ेवत र्मान ह.ै 
 
102 "In the Sâmkhya-philosophy these Pralayas take place whenever the three Gunas of Prakriti recover their 
equipoise, while creation results from the upsetting of the equipoise between them" (Müller 1971: 110). 
 
103 P 62.14 उपित रहन ेपर भी. 
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second object alluded to, this first object cannot be considered to be absolutely eternal, 
that is, eternal with an unchanged existence.104 
 
Sāṃkhya distinguishes between two forms of Prakṛti, the unmanifest Creatrix (avyakta) 
that is uncreated and the manifest Creatrix (vyakta) that is created. The last is caused 
(hetumat), finite (anitya), active (sakriya) and diverse (aneka). The last is the opposite of 
the first.105 In order to explain the nature of this unmanifest Creatrix the Sāṃkhya 
commentators often use the simile of water which can - as a basic substrate - occur in a 
multiplicity of manifestations such as rain, juice, etc.106 It is clear that Haribhadra Sūri 
endorses the idea of the eternity and unchangebility of a material or quasi-material 
substratum of the world that is active and productive. The unmanifest form of the 
Creatrix, the psycho-material substrate of the world, consisting of the three guṇas, first 
produces the Intellect. But, a material cause (upādāna) cannot produce an effect without 
changing itself in the process. This is illustrated in Sāṃkhya by means of the simile of the 
causal transformation (pariṇāma) of milk into curds107 wherein milk is the upādāna, the 
material cause of curds. If, in this manner, the unmanifest Creatrix is the upādāna of the 
Intellect, it must itself change in the process and hence it cannot be eternal in the sense of 
unchanging (avikṛta). 
 
घटािप कुलालािदसापके्ष ंँयत ेभवते।् 
अतो न तत ् पिृथािदपिरणामसमुवम॥्२१८॥ 
218. ghaṭādy api kulālādi-sāpekṣaṃ dṛśyate bhavet; 
ato na tat pṛthivy-ādi-pariṇāma-samudbhavam. 
 
It is also seen that <the production of> a jar, etc., requires a potter, etc. Therefore it is not 
possible that it is produced from a transformation of earth, etc., <alone>. 
 
                                                      
 
104 P 62.18 अिवकृत भाव स.े 
 
105 Larson 1998: 10. 
 
106 Larson 1975: 31. 
 
107 Ibid. 
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P. Also we get a jar, etc., by producing it with the help of a potter, etc. So regarding these 
<products like a jar, etc.> one cannot say that the sole cause 108  of them is the 
transformation of earth, etc. 
 
One of the offshoots of the Sāṃkhya theory of causality is that it restricts the concept of 
cause (kāraṇa) solely to the material cause (upādāna), considering all other causes as 
auxiliary appliances (kārakāṇi) and granting them only a minor role. Matter is, in fact, 
the same in the cause and the effect. That is why causality is simply a process of 
transformation of the guṇas (guṇa-pariṇāma) inherent in the Creatrix.109 What is the role 
of the efficient cause (nimitta-kāraṇa) or the agency in this matter (the weaver and the 
loom in case of a cloth, God (īśvara) in case of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of 
creation)?110 The Puruṣa is not - not as a unity and not as a plurality - the efficient cause 
of the universe or of products in general. The Puruṣa is merely a 'spectator'111 or a 
'knower' (jña). 
 
तऽािप दहेः कता र् चेवैासावानः पथृक।् 
पथृगवेिेत चदे ्भोग आनो युत ेकथम?्॥२१९॥ 
219. tatrāpi dehaḥ kartā cen naivāsāv ātmanaḥ pṛthak; 
pṛthag eveti ced bhoga ātmano yujyate katham? 
 
If one argues that the body is also an agent in this case, this <body> is not at all separate 
from the Soul. If one argues that it is indeed separate, how can the Soul possibly have 
experience? 
 
                                                      
 
108 P 62.22 एकमाऽ कारण. 
 
109 "Man beschränkte den Begriff der Ursache (kāraṇam) ausschießlich auf die materielle Ursache. Allen 
andere Ursachen wies man als Hilfsmitteln (kārakāṇi) eine bescheidene Nebenrolle zu. Die Materie ist aber 
in Ursache (kāraṇam) und Wirkung (kāryam) dieselbe. Und so kam man zu der Formel, daß die Wirkung 
nicht neu entsteht, sondern in der Ursache bereits vorhanden ist, und daß jedes scheinbare Werden und 
Vergehen nur in einer Umgestaltung oder Umwandlung (pariṇāmaḥ) der vorhandenen Materie besteht" 
(Frauwallner 1953: 386). 
 
110 King 1999: 208. 
 
111 Hulin 1978: 145 and Sharma 2003: 161ff. 
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P. One can also argue that the body of the potter, etc., is the creator of the jar, etc., not 
<his> Soul. Our answer to this is that the body is not separate from the Soul. That is why, 
according to the <Jaina> scholars in question, the Soul is completely pervading <the 
body>.112 If one argues that the body is really separate from the Soul, our question will 
be: How can the Soul be an agent of experience?113 That is the reason why the Soul can 
become an agent of experience only with the help of a body. 
 
If the individual puruṣa or ātman cannot be a cause because it is inactive, what then 
about the body? According to the Sāṃkhya each sentient being is linked to a puruṣa that 
is limitless and not restricted to the physical body. The Jaina objection is that the 
individual Soul cannot exceed the limits of the body. According to the Jainas the Soul 
(jīva) of non-liberated sentient beings has the same size as the body.114 Next, in Sāṃkhya 
the individual puruṣa possesses a 'witnesshood' (puruṣasya sākṣitvam);115 it witnesses the 
Intellect, etc. According to Sāṃkhya the puruṣa is also an experiencer (bhoktṛ).116 But 
this is incompatible with its being a non-agent (akartṛ). The Sāṃkhya also states that the 
body - or any matter that is made up of the three guṇas - and the Soul are absolutely 
different.117 How then can it be an 'experiencer'? Arguably, the Sāṃkhya means that the 
                                                      
 
112 P 63.2 सवर्ापी. 
 
113 P 63.3 भोगकता र्. 
 
114 Bronkhorst 2000: 9. 
 
115 SK 19: tasmāc ca viparyāsāt siddhaṃ sākṣitvam asya puruṣasya; kaivalyaṃ mādhyasthyaṃ draṣṭṛtvam 
akartṛ-bhāvaś ca: "And from that contrast it follows that the Spirit is endowed with the characteristics of 
witnessing, isolation, indifference, perception and inactivity" (Sharma 1933: 22, 30). 
 
116  SK 17: saṃghāta-parārthatvāt tri-guṇādi-viparyayād adhiṣṭhānāt; puruṣo ’sti bhoktṛ-bhāvāt 
kaivalyārthaṃ pravṛtteś ca: "The Spirit exists, since composite (objects) are meant for another; since it is 
the reverse of that which has the three Attributes and the rest; since there must be control; since there must 
be someone who enjoys; and since there is activity for release" (Sharma 1933: 20, 27, italics mine). It is 
important to note that the Spirit is labeled an enjoyer or an experiencer (bhoktṛ). 
 
117 "The Soul is perfectly indifferent and, therefore, also not the vehicle of moral responsibility. This office 
is assumed by the subtle or internal body, which is chiefly formed of the inner organs and the senses, and 
which surrounds the Soul. This internal body <liṅga-śarīra, the 'mark' body comprised of the buddhi up to 
the tan-mātras> accompanies the Soul from one existence into another, and is, therefore the real principle 
of metempsychosis. It is the object of the Sāṃkhya philosophy to teach people to know the absolute 
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Soul is a passive reflector of the experiences of the mind-body complex just as the 
unconscious mind is a reflector of the consciousness of the Soul. 
 
दहेभोगने नवैा भावतो भोग इत।े 
ूितिबोदयात ् िक ुयथों पवू र्सिूरिभः॥२२०॥ 
220. deha-bhogena naivāsya bhāvato bhoga iṣyate; 
pratibimbodayāt kintu yathoktaṃ pūrva-sūribhiḥ. 
 
Since it is the body that experiences, it is, consequently, not accepted that it is the <Soul> 
that experiences since it is only <like> the appearance of a reflection. Accordingly early 
sages have said: … 
 
P. The following answer can be given. Since it is the body that incites experience, the 
agency of experience does not really lie in the Soul but falls <on it> like a shade.118 
Accordingly ancient sages have said: … 
 
"पुषोऽिवकृतावै िनभा र्समचतेनम।् 
मनः करोित सािापािधः िटकं यथा॥२२१॥ 
221. "puruṣo ’vikṛtātmaiva sva-nirbhāsam acetanam; 
manaḥ karoti sānnidhyād upādhiḥ sphaṭikaṃ yathā. 
 
िवभेिरणतौ बुौ भोगोऽ कत।े 
ूितिबोदयः े यथा चमसोऽिस"॥२२२॥ 
222. vibhaktedṛk-pariṇatau buddhau bhogo ’sya kathyate; 
pratibimbodayaḥ svacche yathā candramaso ’mbhasi." 
 
The Soul has a changeless essence. It causes the unconscious mind to reflect <the Soul's 
consciousness in the mind> by its <mere> presence. <This seeming consciousness of the 
                                                                                                                                                                 
distinction between Soul and matter in its most subtle transformations, as it appears in the inner organs" 
(Garbe 1897: 11, italics mine). 
 
118 P 63.8 परछाई पड़न ेजसैा ह.ै 
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mind> is <merely> a fill in like <the reflection of color in> a crystal. The Intellect is 
developed in such a way that it is different <from the Soul>. One says that it experiences 
<the Soul> like the reflection, etc., of the moon in clear water. 
 
P. The Soul has an essence that is, by itself, changeless119 and mirrors itself as it were in 
the unconscious mind, that is, makes it as if conscious120 in the same way as a colored 
object placed beside a crystal mirrors itself in the crystal, viz. as colored. When the 
Intellect or the mind,121 that is separate122 from the Soul, obtains another form in this 
manner we readily say that the Soul is the subject of that experience. To argue in this 
manner is the same as you would consider the reflection of the moon falling on clear 
water, or the actions of this reflection as the actions of the moon. To this we state the 
following: … 
 
According to Sāṃkhya there is a difference between consciousness and experience. Only 
'the seat of thought and feeling' (antaḥkaraṇa, the inner mental apparatus, consisting of 
manas, ahamkāra, and buddhi) is the device for experience, not the Soul.123 The Soul is 
pure consciousness that reflects or mirrors itself in buddhi or manas and makes it appear 
as if it is a conscious receptor of experience.124 
                                                      
 
119 P 63.14 य ंअिवकारी प. 
 
120 P 63.15 चतेन. 
 
121 P 63.17 बिु = मन. 
 
122 िवभ = P 63.17 पथृक ्ित. 
 
123  "Human awareness functions through the 'inner instrumentality' (antaḥkarana) comprised of the 
following three principles: 1. The mind-organ (manas) (…); 2. The "I-maker" (ahaṃkāra) (…); and 3. The 
Intellect (buddhi) (…) Puruṣa provides the 'frame' for the above mental processes, and though omnipresent, 
puruṣa remains 'unseen' and transcendent of prakṛti's activities" (Whicher 1998: 90). 
 
124 "(…) consciousness and awareness are distinct. Consciousness is passive, inert, sākṣin (witness), 
agentless (puruṣa). Awareness is active questioning of an agent (prakṛti). Puruṣa is pure consciousness; 
and, by its being in proximity to buddhi, buddhi appears as though it has consciousness when, in fact, all it 
has are awareness and the Intellect. Sūtra 99 in the Sāṃkhyapravacanasūtra clearly spells this out: 
"(Actual) superintendence is of the Antaḥkarana [includes manas, karaṇa, and buddhi], because it is 
lighted up by Puruṣa, as is the case with the iron" (Burke 1988: 22, also citing Sinha, 
Sāṃkhyapravacanasūtram, Book 1, Sūtra 99, 1915). 
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ूितिबोदयोऽ नामतू र्ने युत।े 
मैुरितूसगंा न व ैभोगः कदाचन॥२२३॥ 
223. pratibimbodayo ’py asya nāmūrtatvena yujyate; 
muktair atiprasaṃgāc ca na vai bhogaḥ kadācana. 
 
The appearance of the reflection of this <Soul in the Intellect> is also not correct because 
<the Soul> is immaterial and because this leads to an unwarrantable conclusion. 
 
P. The matter of the falling of the reflection of the Soul on the Intellect is not reasonable. 
The reason is that the Soul is an immaterial and incorporeal principle,125 whereas the 
capacity to throw its own reflection on a mirror126 is possible only in case of a corporeal 
substance. Secondly, if the reflection of a worldly Soul can fall on the Intellect, it must 
likewise fall <on the Intellect in case> of liberated selves. The point of all this is that 
according to the <Sāṃkhya> scholars mentioned the <reflection of the> Soul can never 
become an experiencer. Otherwise it must stay an agent of experience in the state of 
Liberation also. 
 
The Soul is immaterial and incorporeal. It is not an object.127 So the comparison with an 
object reflecting itself in a mirror, in this case Buddhi or the Intellect, does not hold. The 
use of the simile of the reflection on a mirror is not fortuitous. Other examples are 
colored light reflected in a crystal, or the moon reflected in clear water. The purity or 
clearness of the Intellect is due to its high sāttvic character which is responsible for the 
capacity of the lucent reflection of the consciousness of the Puruṣa. There is a second 
objection. The Soul is not an 'active' agent of experience. It is only a reflector of 
experience. If it would be an active agent of experience in worldly souls it must remain 
so in case of liberated souls. 
 
                                                      
 
125 P 63.25 अमू र् = अभौितक. 
 
126 P 63.25 ूितिबबंपाऽ, lit. an 'image-container.' 
 
127 "The Soul <puruṣa> is pure consciousness, not embodied consciousness nor consciousness of a content 
having the form of an object" (Bhattacharyya 1956: 192). 
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न च पवू र्भावा मुानामसगंतः। 
भवार-भाव ेच पिरणामोऽिनवािरतः॥२२४॥ 
224. na ca pūrva-svabhāvatvāt sa muktānām asaṃgataḥ; 
svabhavāntara-bhāve ca pariṇāmo ’nivāritaḥ. 
 
And this <objection> is not unreasonable because of the earlier state of liberated 
<Selves>. And when <the Soul> acquires another disposition, the change <of it> is 
inevitable. 
 
P. Because according to the scholars mentioned liberated Selves possess a special 
disposition128 in <their> worldly state so that their reflections are falling on the Intellect 
and, consequently, in this manner they are agents of experience. That is why our 
objection that according to these <Sāṃkhya scholars> the liberated Selves must possess 
this same special disposition in the state of Liberation is not unreasonable. So their 
reflection falls on the Intellect and they must, consequently, be agents of experience. If 
they argue that in liberated Selves such a new disposition arises that they did not have in 
<their> worldly state, the scholars mentioned are obliged to accept that the Soul is such a 
principle wherein workings of transformation of form are usually active.129 
 
दहेात ् पथृ एवा न च िहंसादयः िचत।् 
तदभावऽेिनिमाथ ंबः शभुाशभुः॥२२५॥ 
225. dehāt pṛthaktva evāsya na ca hiṃsādayaḥ kvacit; 
tad-abhāve ’nimittatvāt kathaṃ bandhaḥ śubhāśubhaḥ. 
 
 
And if this <Sāṃkhyan Soul> is separate from the body, <it can>not <experience> 
injury, etc., at all. However, if this <injury, etc.> does not exist <as affecting the Soul>, 
how can there be bondage <of karma>, pure and impure. For, there is no material cause 
<involved>. 
                                                      
 
128 P 64.7 भाविवशषे. 
 
129 पिरणाम P 64.13 प-पारण की ूिबया. 
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P. If the Soul is strictly separate from the body, injury, etc., ought never to be possible 
because then one can say that injury, etc., are actions that affect the body, not the Soul. 
And if injury, etc., does not exist <for the Soul>, how then can the pure and impure 
bondage of karma <in the Soul> be possible since in that case the instrumental cause130 of 
bondage of karma <injury, etc.> will not exist. 
 
Ṭ. The intention of Haribhadra is <to say> that the instrumental causes of the bondage of 
karma are injury, etc. 
 
According to the Sāṃkhya karma does not affect the Soul. It affects the subtle body 
(sūkṣma-śarīra) composed of the antaḥkaraṇa, the five tanmātras, the five organs of 
action, and the five organs of perception. It is this subtle body that transmigrates, not the 
Soul.131 
 
बात ेन ससंारो मिुवा र्ऽोपपत।े 
यमािद तदभाव ेच सवर्मवे पाथ र्कम॥्२२६॥ 
226. bandhādṛte na saṃsāro muktir vā’syopapadhyate; 
yamādi tad-abhāve ca sarvam eva hy apārthakam. 
 
When bondage is not acceded, neither the cycle of rebirth nor Liberation is justified, and 
when these do not exist, restraint, etc., <are> all senseless. 
 
P. Without the bondage of karma it is impossible for a Soul to be absorbed in the cycle of 
rebirth,132 nor can Liberation be attained. And when there is no Liberation all good 
activities in conformity to that,133 viz. restraint, etc. - that are supposed to lead to 
Liberation - will be poorly established. 
                                                      
 
130 P 64.20 िनिम कारण as opposed to उपादान कारण. 
 
131 Burke 1988: 24. 
 
132 P 64.26 पनुज र्चब म ॅमण करना. 
 
133 P 64.28 सदनुान. 
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Ṭ. With the expression 'restraint, etc.' are meant the eight good activities in conformity to 
what the Sāṃkhya-Yoga tradition calls the 'constituents of yoga.'134 The eight constituents 
of yoga are: restraint, limitation, posture, breath-control, withdrawal of the senses, 
concentration, meditation, and contemplation.135 
 
आा न बत ेनािप मुतऽेसौ कदाचन। 
बत ेमुत ेचािप ूकृित ानिेत चते॥्२२७॥ 
227. ātmā na badhyate nāpi mucyate ’sau kadācana; 
badhyate mucyate cāpi prakṛti svātmaneti cet. 
 
If one argues that it is the Creatrix itself that is bound and liberated, this Soul is never 
bound nor liberated. 
 
P. One can argue that <in Sāṃkhya> there is neither bondage nor Liberation of the Soul, 
but that the Creatrix is sometimes spontaneously involved136 in bondage, sometimes in 
Liberation. To this we answer the following: … 
 
In Sāṃkhya it is not the Soul that is bound or liberated. The Soul is eternally unbound. So 
it does not need to be liberated. It is the Creatrix in the form of the Intellect, Egoity, etc., 
that makes the Soul appear as bound.137 
 
 
 
                                                      
 
134 Ṭ 65.2 योगागं. 
 
135 Ṭ 65.4 यम (not यह as in the text), िनयम, आसन, ूाणायाम, ूाहार, धारणा, ान, समािध. 
 
136 P 65.9 ूकृित ही अपन ेआप कभी ब की भागी बनती. 
 
137 SK 62: tasmān na badhyate nāpi mucyate nāpi saṃsarati kaścit, saṃsarati badhyate mucyate ca 
nānāśrayā prakṛtiḥ: "Therefore no <Soul> transmigrates, is bound or liberated. <Only> the Creatrix in its 
various forms transmigrates, is bound and liberated." "Ignorance caused by nondiscrimination is what 
causes prakṛti's evolutes to remain in the transmigratory cycle, but the root cause of that cycle is prakṛti's 
'willing' to manifest itself once in all its complicated glory to a puruṣa" (Burke 1988: 21). 
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एकानेकैपाया िनाया न सवर्था। 
ताः िबयाराभावाद ्बमोक्षौ त ुयिुतः॥२२८॥ 
228. ekāntenaika-rūpāyā nityāyāś ca na sarvathā; 
tasyāḥ kriyāntarābhāvād bandha-mokṣau tu yuktitaḥ. 
 
Since this <Creatrix> is always absolutely uniform and eternal, the bondage and 
Liberation of it have no justification since it cannot act in any way. 
 
P. When the Creatrix is always unchangeable and eternal, the causation of the one 
activity <viz. Liberation> in lieu of the second activity <viz. bondage> is not possible, 
and in this manner to talk about the Liberation and bondage of the Creatrix is not relevant 
at all. 
 
मोक्षः ूकृयोगो यदतोऽाः स कथ ंभवते।् 
पिवगमापेथा तिवरोधतः॥२२९॥ 
229. mokṣaḥ prakṛty-ayogo yad ato ’syāḥ sa kathaṃ bhavet; 
svarūpa-vigamāpattes tathā tantra-virodhataḥ. 
 
Liberation is the isolation <of the Soul> from the Creatrix. How is this <Liberation> of 
this <Soul> from that <Creatrix> possible? For, <if this is possible> this leads to the 
destruction of the essence <of the Creatrix>. Besides, this stands in contradiction with 
<the Sāṃkhya> doctrine. 
 
P. Again, in the theory of the <Sāṃkhya> scholars mentioned, Liberation is the name of 
the breaking of the link <between the Soul> and the Creatrix.138 How can the Creatrix 
attain such a Liberation? For then the very essence of the Creatrix must be considered to 
be destroyed. Secondly, the hypothesis mentioned, viz. of the breaking of the bondage of 
the Creatrix from the Creatrix139 is contradictory with the philosophy accepted by the 
scholars mentioned. In Classical Sāṃkhya the liṅga is the 'mark' of the transmigrating 
                                                      
 
138 P 65.18 ूकृित के सबंिवेद. 
 
139 P 65.21 'ूकृित का ूकृित स ेसबंिवेद' कना. 
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entity. This liṅga is the Creatrix consisting of the twenty-five tattvas from eternal 
consciousness down to the five organs of sense, five of activity (buddīndriya or 
jñānendriya, and karmendriya respectively) and the five subtle elements that are the 
objects of sense (tan-mātras).140 
 
पिवशंिततज्ञो यऽ तऽाौम ेरतः। 
जटी मणु्डी िशखी वाऽिप मुत ेनाऽ सशंयः॥२३०॥ 
230. pañcaviṃśati-tattva-jño yatra tatrāśrame rataḥ; 
jaṭī muṇḍī śikhī vā’pi mucyate nātra saṃśayaḥ. 
 
पुषोिदता मिुिरित त ेिचरनःै। 
इ ंन घटत ेचयेिमित सवर्मयिुमत॥्२३१॥ 
 
231. puruṣasyoditā muktir iti tantre cirantanaiḥ; 
itthaṃ na ghaṭate ceyam iti sarvam ayuktimat. 
 
The one who knows the twenty-five principles is liberated - no doubt about that! - 
abiding wherever <he wants>, in an āśrama, as an ascetic, a shaven-headed <renouncer> 
or a Brahmin. In <their> works the ancients have said that Liberation is produced for the 
Soul. In this manner this <Liberation> cannot take place <in the Sāṃkhya system>. So all 
<this> is unreasonable. 
 
P. The ancient teachers recognized by the <Sāṃkhya> scholars mentioned have said in 
their texts: "The one who has knowledge of the twenty-five principles attains Liberation; 
there is no doubt about that. And, if desired, this person can live in a āśrama, if desired as 
an ascetic, 141  if desired as a shaven-headed <renouncer>, 142  and, if desired, as a 
                                                      
 
140 The SK says: "The subtle body (linga), previously arisen, unconfined, constant, inclusive of the great 
one (mahat) etc, through the subtle elements, not having enjoyment, transmigrates, (because of) being 
endowed with bhavas ('conditions' or 'dispositions'). As a picture (does) not (exist) without a support, or as 
a shadow (does) not (exist) without a post and so forth; so too the instrument (linga or karana) does not 
exist without that which is specific (i.e. a subtle body)" (Larson 1998: 268). 
 
141 जिटन ् = P 66.4 जटाधारी, wearing the hair twisted together. 
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Brahmin."143 In this manner these teachers were convinced that it was the Soul only that 
attained Liberation. But when the argumentation of the <Sāṃkhya> scholars mentioned 
is accepted, the attainment of Liberation of the Soul seems impossible. Hence it is 
established that everything these <Sāṃkhya scholars> have said in this connection is 
unreasonable. 
 
Ṭ. The twenty-five principles indicated were already enumerated earlier in the Kārikā 
mentioned <before> and they are as follows: (1) the Creatrix, (2) the Intellect, (3) Egoity, 
(4-14) the eleven senses, (15-19) the five subtle elements, (20-24) the five gross 
elements, and (25) the Soul. 
 
अऽािप पुषा ेमिुिमि वािदनः। 
ूकृित ंचािप सायात ् कमरू् कृितमवे च॥२३२॥ 
232. atrāpi puruṣasyānye muktim icchanti vādinaḥ; 
prakṛtiṃ cāpi sannyāyāt karma-prakṛtim eva ca. 
 
In this connection also other <viz. Jaina> scholars accept that <it is> the Soul <that 
attains> Liberation, and also that according to sound logic the Creatrix is identical to 
karmic matter. 
 
P. Also in this connection some other <Jaina> scholars think that it is the Soul that attains 
Liberation and, reasoning correctly,144 they argue that the Creatrix is another name for 
karmic matter. 
 
Ṭ. The scholars indicated in the Kārikā mentioned are Jaina philosophers because they 
accept such a principle under the name of karmic matter or <simply> karma that is the 
root cause145 of the bondage of the Soul. In equal manner the Creatrix of the Sāṃkhya 
philosophers is such a principle that is the root cause of the bondage of the Soul. But 
                                                                                                                                                                 
142 मिुण्डन ् = P 66.4 मिुण्डत मक. 
 
143 िशिखन ् = P 66.4 िशखाधारी, wearing a tuft of hair on the crown of the head. 
 
144 P 6616 समिुचत यिुमाग र् का अनसुरण करत ेए. 
 
145 Ṭ 66.20 जड़ (…) आा के बधं के िलए उरदायी. 
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there is also a major difference between the karmic matter of the Jaina philosophers and 
the Creatrix of the Sāṃkhya philosophers that should be kept in mind. As we have 
already seen, according to the Sāṃkhya system the whole inanimate world, the twenty-
three principles starting from the Intellect up to the five gross elements, is only a 
transformation146 of the Creatrix. Contrary to that, the karmic matter147 of the Jaina system 
is only a part of the inanimate or material world,148 which means that according to the 
Jaina system one cannot say that the whole inanimate world is but a transformation of 
karmic matter. 
ताानकेपात ् पिरणािमयोगतः। 
आनो बना नोदोषसमुवम॥्२३३॥ 
233. tasyāś cāneka-rūpatvāt pariṇāmitva-yogataḥ; 
ātmano bandhanatvāc ca nokta-doṣa-samudbhavam. 
 
Since this <karmic matter> is multiform, since it has the nature to transform <itself>, and 
since it has the nature to bind the Soul, the flaws mentioned <above> do not arise. 
 
P. Since this karmic matter is of numerous sorts, 149  since therein the process of 
transformation is active, since the binding of the Soul by that <karmic matter> is 
possible, therefore in the <Jaina> thought brought forward <here> there is no scope for 
the flaws that were pointed out in the <Sāṃkhya> thought described earlier. 
 
नामतू मतु र्ता ंयाित मतू न यामतू र्ताम।् 
यतो बातो ायादानोऽसगंत ंतया॥२३४॥ 
234. nāmūrtaṃ murtatāṃ yāti mūrtaṃ na yāty amūrtatām; 
yato bandhād yato nyāyād ātmano ’saṃgataṃ tayā. 
 
                                                      
 
146 Ṭ 66.26 पारण. 
 
147 Ṭ 66.26 कमरू् कृित = कमर्-पुल. 
 
148 Ṭ 66.27 जड़-जगत ् = पुल-जगत ्. 
 
149 For the 148 kinds of karma in Jainism, see Glasenapp 1964: 157ff. 
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<According to the Sāṃkhya> something incorporeal does not turn into something 
corporeal, something corporeal does not turn into something incorporeal. For this reason 
<according to the Sāṃkhya> it is irrational <to say> that the Soul is bound by this 
<karmic matter>. 
  
P. <The Sāṃkhya> might object that since a material object cannot become immaterial 
and since an immaterial object cannot become material, it is not reasonable <for the 
Jainas> to say that the binding, etc., of the Soul is realized by karmic matter. To this our 
answer is: … 
 
दहेशा र्िदसिंवा न यावेेयिुमत।् 
अोािजा चयेिमित बािद सगंतम॥्२३५॥ 
235. deha-sparśādi-saṃvittyā na yāty evety ayuktimat.150 
anyonya-vyāpti-jā ceyam iti bandhādi saṃgatam. 
 
Because the body has the feeling of touch, etc., it is not reasonable to say that <something 
material> does not merge <with immateriality>. And this <feeling> is produced by the 
mutual concomitance <of the Soul and the body>. Hence the binding, etc., <of karmic 
matter with the Soul> is justified. 
 
P. The presence in the Soul of the eventual experience151 of touch, etc., of the body is 
established in such a manner that to say that a corporeal object cannot become material is 
unreasonable. The cause of the experience mentioned is the close mutual relationship152 
of the Soul and the body. Therefore it is also established that the binding, etc., of the Soul 
with karmic matter is a theory that is in accordance with reason. 
 
Ṭ. The intention of Haribhadra is <to say> that, when the body touches objects of 
different sorts the Soul situated in this body starts to have experiences of different sorts, 
consisting of pleasure or pain. The following consequence is drawn from this, viz. that 
                                                      
 
150 Not अिुमत ्, see P 67.16 अ-यिुसगंत. 
 
151 सिंवि = P 67.15 अनभुिूत. 
 
152 अोाि = P 67.17 परर घिन सबं. 
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there is a close relationship between the body and the Soul contained in that body. With 
the help of this example relating to experience Haribhadra wants to establish that such a 
close relationship between a conscious Soul and inanimate karma153 can exist that the 
Soul can be thrown into the bondage of the cycle of rebirth. 
 
मतू र्याऽानो योगो घटत ेनभसो यथा। 
उपघातािदभाव ज्ञानवे सरुािदना॥२३६॥ 
236. mūrtayā’py ātmano yogo ghaṭate nabhaso yathā; 
upaghātādi-bhāvaś ca jñānasyeva surādinā. 
 
The connection between the Soul and material <karmic matter> is also possible <just as it 
is in case> of the atmosphere, and also <in case> of the weakening, etc., of consciousness 
by liquor. 
 
P. The connection of the immaterial Soul with matter, viz. karmic matter, is also possible 
in this manner, viz. just as it is of immaterial space154 with a material jar. And in this 
manner the weakening,155 etc., in the Soul as a result of the binding of karmic matter is 
possible just as drinking liquor, etc., weakens consciousness. 
 
Ṭ. In order to establish the possibility of the connection between the Soul and karma, 
Haribhadra places two different examples before us in the verse in question, the example 
of the connection between a material jar and immaterial space156 and the second, the 
example of the weakening of consciousness resulting from the subtle mental processes 
that follow from gross corporeal processes <like> the drinking of liquor. Among them the 
first example will make us understand that - as Haribhadra sees it - a jar is a material 
substance while space an immaterial substance in the same manner that according to him 
karma is a material substance while the Soul is an immaterial substance. And the second 
                                                      
 
153 Ṭ 67.25 चतेन आा का जड़ 'कम' के साथ. 
 
154 नभस ् = P 68.2 आकाश. 
 
155 P 68.3 शिक्षय. 
 
156 Ṭ 68.7 एक मतू र् घट तथा अमतू र् आकाश. 
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example brought forward will mainly make us understand in that manner the example of 
the 'experience of the Soul produced by contact with the body' of that the latter verse. 
 
एव ंूकृितवादोऽिप िवज्ञयेः स एव िह। 
किपलोतवै िदो िह स महामिुनः॥२३७॥ 
237. evaṃ prakṛti-vādo ’pi vijñeyaḥ satya eva hi; 
kapiloktatvataś caiva divyo hi sa mahā-muniḥ. 
 
Thus also the doctrine of the Creatrix should be considered to be true indeed and <also> 
because it is taught by Kapila <since> he is really a divine great sage. 
 
P. For these reasons the doctrine of the Creatrix should also be considered a legitimate 
doctrine, also because Kapila - a great and divine sage - proposed this doctrine. 
 
In order to understand Haribhadra Sūri's appraisal of the Sāṃkhya doctrines we can point 
to the parallels between the Sāṃkhya and Jaina systems. Both teach a multiplex dualism: 
they postulate two distinct realities and, besides, a radical difference between a plurality 
of Selves, the puruṣas and jīvas. In both systems the Selves acquire karmic bodies157 and 
they strive for ultimate kaivalya or kevala, Perfect Isolation or Liberation. Moreover, the 
Jainas also use of the word prakṛti for karma.158 
 
 
                                                      
 
157 "In sūtra 6.67 of the Sāṃkhyapravacana it is said that karma is the cause (nimitta) of the relationship 
between Prakṛti and Puruṣa (…) Accumulated karma forms the karmāśaya, the recipient that envelops the 
jīva, that is, the Intellect or consciousness evolved due to the interaction of Prakṛti and Puruṣa" (Krishan 
1997: 141f., italics mine). 
 
158 "In Jainism prakṛti is used to denote matter in the form of karma. In Jainism karma is material stuff 
(pudgala) that binds and produces changes in the Soul. (…) Before it enters the Soul the karma stuff is 
undifferentiated. Various natures or types (prakṛti) of karma are molded from this karma matter after 
interaction with the Soul has begun. The Jainas explain that bondage of the Soul can be understood from 
four points of view, one of which is prakṛti. The specific nature (prakṛti) assumed by the previously 
undifferentiated karma matter is determined by the type of activity performed. The nature of karmic matter 
is first divided into eight kinds (mūlaprakṛti-s) (knowledge obscuring, perception obscuring, energy 
obstructing, belief and conduct obstructing, duration of life determining, body type determining, family 
type determining, and pain and pleasure producing), and these eight kinds are subdivided into 148 main 
classes called the 148 prakṛti-s" (Jacobsen 1996: 68). 
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Synopsis 
 
Basic tenets of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as regards God (Īśvara) and objections: 
 
1 God is an agent/creator (kartā), 
 
1.1    because He incites all activity of living being with His 
1.1.1 inconceivable power of intelligence, and 
1.1.2 eternal purity. 
 
2 God is the Lord of the universe with His unimpeded and naturally acquired 
 
2.1 desirelessness, 
2.2 masterfulness, and 
2.3 virtue. 
 
3 The ignorant mortal has no control over his destiny;  God drives mortals toward heaven   
or hell. 
 
<4 God is the agent of creation of the world> (Implied in Objection 3, verse 201) 
 
Objection 1: If all beings act on their own accord, why 1.1 <and 3>? 
 
Objection 2: Actions of living beings are effective as well as ineffective. 
 
If non-effective, why 1.1 < and 3>? 
 
If effective and unconfined, the belief in God is a matter of faith only, but nothing 
to be set aside (Verse 202). 
 
Objection 3: If God is a being that has accomplished everything (kṛta-kṛtya) and has no  
desires (cf. 2.1), why 4? 
 
Objection 4: If 3, God cannot be a being that has accomplished everything. 
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God as an agent defined otherwise: 
 
1 A Supreme Soul, a person 'standing  at  the  threshold  of Final  Emancipation,' can  be  
   called a God. 
 
2 This  Supreme  Soul  is  an   agent  of  bondage, of  the  cycle of   rebirth  and  of  Final  
    Emancipation as well, in the sense that He is a model  that incites other living  beings 
to follow his path. 
 
Basic tenets of Sāṃkhya and objections: 
 
1 All  originates from  the Creatrix (prakṛti) by  degrees,  as effects: the Intellect,  Egoity,  
   the senses the rudimentary elements, and the collection of gross elements. 
 
2 Every object is produced from the transformation of earth, etc. only. 
    
   Objection: Some say that this is a matter of faith only. 
 
3 Nothing is produced by the Soul (puruṣa). 
 
4 The <original and unmanifest> Creatrix is eternal. 
 
   Objection: If the <unmanifest> Creatrix is eternal (meaning, having  an unchangeable    
   essence), then no evolution is possible. 
 
5 It is the essence of the <unmanifest> Creatrix to produce the evolutes. 
    
   Objection: Then  why  does  it  not produce the evolutes always and only now and then. 
   
    Answer:  It   is   the  essence  of  the  <unmanifest>  Creatrix  to  produce  the  evolutes      
    only accidentally. 
 
   Objection: In that case the <original> Creatrix does not have a stable essence. 
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6 Objection: Production presumes  a  material cause. A material cause is  not eternal. The  
   <unmanifest> Creatrix is the material cause of  the evolutes. Hence  the Creatrix cannot  
   be absolutely eternal. 
 
7 Objection: The  production  of  ordinary  objects  requires   an   efficient  cause.  So, the  
   production of things cannot simply be a transformation of state (see 2). 
 
8 The body is the efficient cause, not the Soul which is essentially a non-agent. 
   Objection: The body  is  not separate  from  the Soul. If  it would,  the soul cannot be an   
   agent of experience. 
 
9 The <mind> body <complex>  is  the  agent of  experience. Its experience  falls  on  the  
   inactive Soul as a reflection. 
 
10 On the other hand, the Soul’s consciousness reflects itself  in  the  mind,  the  Intellect,   
   etc. 
 
   Objection: The argument of the Soul reflecting itself  in the Intellect, etc.,  is not correct  
   because the Soul is immaterial. 
 
11 The Soul is separate from the body. 
 
   Objection: In that case  the Soul cannot suffer. If   the soul cannot suffer, no bondage of  
   karma is possible. Then neither the cycle of rebirth  nor final emancipation are possible.    
   In that case all activities related to both are senseless. 
 
12 It is the Creatrix  in the form of  the Intellect, Egoity, etc., that is  bound and  liberated,  
   not the Soul. 
 
   Objection:  The  <original>   Creatrix   is   said   to  be  uniform   and  eternal,  meaning  
   unchangeable. In that case neither bondage nor liberation is possible. 
 
13 Liberation is the isolation of the Soul from the Creatrix. 
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   Objection: In that  case the  essence  of  the Creatrix  would  be destroyed. The ancients   
   have declared that it  is  the Soul  that  is liberated.  This is impossible in  Sāṃkhya  and   
   hence unreasonable. 
 
   Objection: The Jains argue that it is the soul that attains Liberation and that the Creatrix  
   is karma. Karma is multiform, transforms and binds the soul. 
 
14 Something corporeal  cannot turn into something incorporeal,  and vice versa.  So, one  
   cannot say that the Soul is bound by karmic matter. 
 
   Objection: The body has <immaterial>  feelings.  This  is  the  result  of  the  interaction  
   between the Soul and the body. In the same way the Soul acquires karma. 
 
15 The Sāṃkhya doctrine of the Creatrix is true <if interpreted as karma>. 
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Abbreviations 
 
Ṭ  Ṭippaṇī by Dixit on the Śāstravārtāsamuccaya 
NS  Nyāyasūtra  
NSBh  Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya 
P  Paraphrase of Dixit of the Śāstravārtāsamuccaya 
YS  Yogasūtra 
ŚVS  Śāstravārtāsamuccaya 
ṢDS  Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya 
SK  Sāṃkhyakārikā 
YŚ  Yogaśāstra 
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